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Col Arnold is a Master Navigator with over 1800 hours in the F-15E, EF-111A, F-4G, F-111F, and F-111D. He has served numerous tours in Air Operations Centers in CENTCOM and PACOM. His military decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal with five oak leaf clusters, The Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Aerial Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Air Force Commendation Medal, the Air Force Achievement Medal, and the Humanitarian Service Medal. How EW became a part of the cyber portfolio is partially due to shared physical characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
"There is no organization or service capability in place with the express mission and responsibility to engage the adversary to ensure the sovereign ability to continuously operate and maneuver as required in and through the electromagnetic domain. This demands a consolidated electronic combat capability for the Joint Force and the Joint Force Commander. In this strategy, EW advances beyond using electro-magnetic energy to protect platforms or to project Radio Frequency (RF) energy against an adversary."
cyberspace as a domain rather than an operation." 5 EW uses the electromagnetic spectrum to warn or defend as do specific computer-network operations. According to an Air Force recognized cyber expert at AFRL, the main two reasons EW were included in the cyber portfolio was initially a resource grab to build a viable new command and the desperate need for a "Billy Mitchell moment"-something cyber operations needed which was an offensive effect that EW could deliver. significance with regard to how the command element should consider the effect of influence at the personal, public and executive levels during conflict.
Regardless of how much a commander studies theory or understands the adaptation of Col John Boyd's OODA loop to get into the mind of the enemy, personnel may fail to be able to act during combat or the stresses during combat training. This happened during Ulchi Focus Lens, the Air Forces largest command and control exercise conducted in PACAF. The
Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) must be complete and distributed to all combat units by 1800
hours each day. Every tactical level commander was well very sharp, each with a cool and calm demeanor. After just one day of the exercise in full swing, the network links were cut and everyone from up and down the 7 th Air Force chain stopped working; they were completely overwhelmed and unable to finish the war exercise (normally a ten day event).
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The ultimate aim of this agency would focus on attacks on the mind of the enemy commander and render him powerless through disorganization or confusion. This is the precise effect that takes place in the orientation piece of the OODA loop. Once intelligence gathers information, this agency will be able to disrupt the orientation process of an adversary, thus moving him in to a position of disadvantage.
As technology and information is passed on and through the modern battle space, opportunities will arrive with shorter and shorter time to react that can be used to affect an adversary. Consequently, the enemy could inject overwhelming or just barely noticeable packages of misinformation at certain levels to create devastating effects. Again, focusing on John Boyd's orientation piece of the OODA loop; to affect the cognitive realm of an adversary, this agency would be able to psychologically attack an opponent and achieve victory without actual fighting.
-Never in history have so many people found themselves intimately tied to-cyberspace-that is limited only be the human imagination.‖ -Lt Col David A. Umphress, USAFR

DIFFERENCES OF EW AND CYBER
As Gen Elder noted in his Global Cyber Operations briefing at the First Annual Cyber
Symposium, cyber capabilities included efforts that overload information servers (denial of service), data loss or manipulation, or destruction of information system integrity. Here we see again the net-centric identity of cyberspace. Although wireless networks can be affected by operations in the electromagnetic spectrum, the preponderance of information networks and associated computer equipment fall outside of traditional EW target sets.
Similarly, Gen Elder's cyber "Digital Attack Defense Initiatives" include application code vulnerability analysis, centralized system configuration management, software diversity, database clustering, cyber side-arms or self-defensive tools, and cyber armor or system hardening to describe areas of focus for the Air Force with respect to cyber. None of these offensive cyber operations will deny an enemy access to the electromagnetic spectrum.
Arguably, this concept and its supporting mission types need to be refined and better articulated.
To consider EW as a physical layer component of cyber operations is simple and appealing. What it misses are those aspects of cyber that are neither EW nor network operations, such as computer security, software/hardware protection, information assurance (albeit a supporting capability of IO), and trust.
It is understandable why the AFCYBER proponents insisted on including EW into cyber operations with our current budget situation. What gets difficult to understand is the expanse of cyberspace itself. Cyber-power is delivered through the effective mastery of three principal elements: the science of electro-magnetism, the technology of electronics, and the infrastructure which may include the interdependent network of information technology. This replicates the trinity of air power articulated by Gen Hap Arnold as he advanced air power: air as the domain, airplane as the technology, and navigation as the infrastructure. Our cyber forefather's intent was to deny all adversaries electromagnetic awareness, transportability, maneuverability, or 26 AFCYBER CONOPs; Version 4; 21 Dec 06; pg 6 effects-generating capability and is a grand vision but, pragmatically very difficult. 27 Because the Air Force hasn't completely resolved what or if AFCYBER will look like, Gen Norton Schwartz has put a halt to further activities relating to the establishment of this new command.
Announced as the "Strategic Pause", the Air Force is rethinking all cyber requirements to better synchronize with other key Air Force mission areas (read EW).
Another area where EW and cyber differ is how information and control are passed using the Seven Layers of the Open Source Interconnection Model (see figure 2) . This model defines a networking framework for implementing information sharing protocols in seven layers. Users working on the network pass control from one layer to the next starting with the application layer, proceeding down the stack over a communication channel and then back up the stack to the end user or recipient. The application layer supports end-user processes and provides application services for the transfer of information on a net. The next layer down is the presentation layer which provides independence from differences in data representation or encryption. Here information is put into the correct format for the application layer to accept.
Below this is the fifth layer or session layer. This is where connections are established, managed, and terminated between applications. Layers four through two concentrate on the transportation of data, creating virtual circuits, and encoding/decoding of data into digital bits.
So far the model has dealt only with information handling. The lowest and last layer, the level where EW can target, is the physical layer. This level provides the hardware means of sending and receiving data on a network. Physical layer components can be jammed or disrupted using modern EW techniques like Digital Radio Frequency Modulation (DRFM) jamming, high power microwaves, or directed energy (High energy lasers). Targeting the physical infrastructure of the network stack will undermine the upper layers. In contrast, cyber operations target layer two 27 AFRL email; 23 Sept 08 understand the difference in target sets if considering an effect using traditional EW vice cyber operations.
Figure 2 (Image from The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics)
The The lowest level is the physical domain where the infrastructure resides. Computers, networks, and cables establish the hardware that information control and transmission can occur. The next level up is the virtual domain where data is stored, managed, and processed to "handle" information. These two domains, by the very nature of the physical characteristics create opportunities for both EW and cyber to exploit. Also within these two domains a potential adversary can wage information in warfare operations. Said another way, the information itself is the target set where data manipulation and information loss can create very desirable military effects. Lastly, and most importantly, is the cognitive domain. This is where information becomes knowledge, where command and control is executed, and the human or social aspect of information warfare can be applied. Of note, the cognitive domain is usually considered above the target set of cyber or EW operations. However, here is another opportunity to examine the concept of trust and reliability with respect to our information systems. As mentioned, EW can generate misinformation effects at the cognitive level which could influence an adversary and place him in a position of disadvantage. The influence agency mentioned above would focus their efforts on this target set. 
CONCLUSION: THE SHORLINE: WHERE EW AND CYBER COEXIST
From differences in definitions, doctrine, and information user models to similarities between EW and cyber; the shoreline between the two mission types clearly exists. Either recognized as a customer, peer capability, or operation passing through, EW shares one area of overlap or shoreline: acquisition of critical and pertinent information. To produce combined power in cyberspace, EW and computer network operations need to effectively integrate to disrupt an adversary's information system while protecting our own, with the objective of gaining information superiority. Net-centric 33 Cyber Silhouettes; pg 204 operations disrupt the processing and use of information while EW disrupts the acquisition and forwarding of information. 34 The focus of cyber is to acquire precise information to manipulate information sharing (as mentioned above in the 7 Layer OSI Model). Acquiring the Intelligence information of a networked air defense system would allow EW to deny or degrade radars and communications to take control of a specific battle field situation. This combined with an offensive cyber attack would substantially increase the combat effectiveness of an operation.
An example of this is the Chinese concept of IO. Their efforts would focus on controlling the flow of information (after they've acquired Intelligence and access) in both the electromagnetic sphere and cyberspace. A successful Chinese EW and cyber operation would manipulate information processing while disrupting command and control capability. environment. There are many tools and physical systems that EW and Cyber share to acquire critical and timely Intelligence.
EW and cyber operations need to be able to operate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels both for offensive and defensive activities. EW and cyber require very detailed and specific information to protect information and information systems. This will allow operations by ensuring availability, integrity and confidentiality; in short, information assurance. 36 Offensively, acquiring delicate information would allow operations that would permit cyber and EW to target telecommunications, electrical power grids, banking, transportation, and a host of military links, nodes, and apertures.
These two mission types provide offensive and defensive capabilities, with the right information, to the warfighter.
The shoreline between EW and cyberspace is the acquisition of specific, timely, and 
